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Before the High Court 
Indigenising Sentencing?  
Bugmy v The Queen 
Thalia Anthony∗  
Abstract 
The grant of special leave in Bugmy v The Queen1 has provided an occasion for 
the High Court to rule on the significance of Indigenous background in 
sentencing in relation to other sentencing considerations. In particular, the 
Court must reconcile the sentencing considerations of deterrence, community 
protection, offence seriousness and criminal history with the principles of 
individualised justice and the recognition of factors specific to the Indigenous 
defendant. These sentencing objectives may appear to be in conflict, but they 
can be reconciled if the Court accepts that the aim of community protection and 
deterrence is furthered through accounting for Indigenous context and 
providing sentences that address Indigenous disadvantage. The emphasis placed 
by the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal and other state and territory 
higher courts on the seriousness of the offence has diminished the significance 
of the disadvantaged circumstances of Indigenous offenders in sentencing, and 
has contributed to increased levels of Indigenous imprisonment. Bugmy v The 
Queen will be important in providing clearer direction on the common law’s 
interpretation of sentencing principles for Indigenous offenders. These have 
undergone substantial revision over the past 20 years. This case provides an 
opportunity for the High Court to consider the role of criminal sentencing in the 
dramatic over-representation of Indigenous Australians in prisons, and how 
sentencing can be structured to promote deterrence outside of prisons. 
I Introduction 
In 1992, R v Fernando2 set down the considerations for sentencing Indigenous 
offenders from disadvantaged communities and how their background may be 
relevant in mitigation. While the New South Wales Supreme Court in Fernando3 
averred to the need for sentencing to reflect the seriousness of violent crimes, it 
matched this with considerations of subjective circumstances of the offender. The 
Fernando principles, as discussed below, have been influential in sentencing 
Indigenous offenders across Australia. However, it is not until now that the High 
Court of Australia has ruled on their significance in sentencing Indigenous 
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1  Transcript of Proceedings, Bugmy v The Queen [2013] HCATrans 111 (10 May 2013). 
2  (1992) 76 A Crim R 58 (‘Fernando’). 
3  Ibid 62–3. 
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offenders vis-à-vis other sentencing principles, particularly the seriousness of the 
offence and the need for deterrence.  
In the case of Bugmy v The Queen,4 which was granted special leave to 
appeal to the High Court in May 2013, there are four grounds of appeal. First, 
whether the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal erred by failing to 
consider manifest inadequacy and/or to consider whether the residual discretion 
should be invoked (that is, even if the Court of Criminal Appeal found that the 
sentence was manifestly inadequate, whether, in exercise of the residual discretion, 
the Crown appeal should have been dismissed). Second, whether the Court of 
Criminal Appeal erred in stating that with the passage of time, the extent to which 
social deprivation in an offender’s youth and background (including those factors 
set out in Fernando)5 must diminish. A related issue is whether the High Court 
should adopt the approach of the Canadian Supreme Court in R v Gladue6 and R v 
Ipeelee,7 requiring sentencing courts to take into account the unique systemic and 
background factors which have played a role in bringing Indigenous offenders 
before the court. Third, whether a sentencing judge can take into account mental 
illness even when such illness did not directly contribute to the commission of the 
offence. If so, how is mental illness relevant to the determination of the sentence. 
This relates to the issue of the role of subjective circumstances, including 
Indigenous background, in sentencing. Fourth, defence counsel will submit that 
general deterrence is a discrete consideration relevant to the purpose of sentencing 
rather than to an assessment of the objective seriousness pursuant to the Crimes 
(Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) div 1A. Accordingly, matters of 
culpability and the subjective circumstances of the offender should be relevant to 
considerations of deterrence. 
This note will first examine the common law principles and statutory 
provisions that provide sentencing courts with discretion to take into account a 
range of subjective and objective factors relevant to the offence and offender. 
These factors may be relevant as aggravating or mitigating circumstances. The 
note will then trace the development and application of the Fernando principles as 
grounds for mitigation in sentencing Indigenous offenders. This feeds into a 
discussion of the procedural history and issues in Bugmy v The Queen and how the 
New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal’s decision represents a 
reinterpretation by Australian courts of the Fernando principles. This 
reinterpretation involves privileging considerations of the objective seriousness of 
the offence, community protection and the need for deterrence over the subjective 
circumstances of the offender. Such an approach precludes a consideration of how 
sentences can be better structured to address circumstances that underpin 
criminality — for example, through remedial institutions and services — and fails 
                                                        
4  Transcript of Proceedings, Bugmy v The Queen [2013] HCATrans 111 (10 May 2013). 
5  (1992) 76 A Crim R 58, 62–3. 
6  [1999] 1 SCR 688. 
7  (2012) SCC 13 [37]. In R v Ipeelee, the Canadian Supreme Court determined that the seriousness of 
the offence should not affect appropriate sanctions being handed down to reflect the offender’s 
Aboriginal heritage and connection to community. 
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to address the detrimental and widescale impact and the inter-generational effect 
that imprisonment has on Indigenous people and their communities.8  
The New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal’s approach to diminishing 
the relevance of Indigenous background, by rendering it less significant when an 
offender engages in serious crime over a lengthy period, is paradoxical given that 
contact with the criminal justice system, and especially imprisonment, aggravates 
the defendant’s social disadvantage.9 Criminologists suggest that hardship 
increases with criminalisation because it alienates the offender from the 
community.10 McCoy argues that prisons exclude the underclass from the moral 
community, and sentences for disadvantaged offenders should be reintegrative to 
assure their stake in the moral community and reduce their offending.11  
In relation to Indigenous offenders, Nicholson asserts that imprisonment 
compounds their disadvantage by perpetuating their cycle of poverty, 
subordination and marginalisation.12 Indigenous disadvantage in the prison is 
particularly harsh because it is in a foreign environment, often a long distance from 
their communities, and because it reinforces historically tense relations between 
Indigenous people and white law enforcers. In the case before the High Court, the 
appellant Bugmy was from a remote community where he had experienced conflict 
with police, had been in and out of detention centres and prisons since a young age, 
and had requested rehabilitation for his alcohol  abuse on numerous occasions, 
although such requests did not result in adequate intervention.13 Should the High 
Court decide that the subjective circumstances of the offence carry little weight, it 
will mean longer prison terms for someone such as Bugmy; on the other hand, 
should the Court decide that more attention should be given to Indigenous 
circumstances, it will promote sentencing outcomes that address these 
circumstances through more appropriate non-penal orders.  
Rather than circumstances of Indigenous disadvantage becoming less 
relevant as the defendant’s criminal history is extended, it becomes more 
incumbent on courts to consider the effect of imprisonment on Indigenous 
defendants and whether alternative sentences may be better suited to breaking their 
cycle of crime. This would fulfil the sentencing objectives of deterrence and 
community protection while accounting for the offender’s culpability.                                                          
8  Figures from the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare show the national rate of Indigenous 
juvenile incarceration is 31 times the non-indigenous rate, and prison sentences are particularly 
high in remote towns. The impact that imprisonment has is inter-generational as prisoners are more 
likely to have children who are eventually imprisoned. Natasha Robinson, ‘Black sentences soar as 
juvenile jails become a “storing house”’, The Australian (Sydney), 5 January 2013, 1; Natasha 
Robinson, ‘Call for review of juvenile sentencing’, The Australian (Sydney), 7 January 2013, 4. 
9  R v Bugmy [2012] NSWCCA 223 [23]. 
10  Michael Tonry, Malign Neglect: Race, Crime and Punishment in America (Oxford University 
Press, 1995) 125; Barbara Hudson ‘Punishment, Poverty and Responsibility: The Case for a 
Hardship Defence’ (1999) 8 Social and Legal Studies 583, 589–90. 
11  Candace McCoy, ‘Review Essay: Sentencing (and) the Underclass’ (1997) 31 Law & Society 
Review 589, 611–12. 
12  John Nicholson, ‘Sentencing Aboriginal Offenders — A Judge’s Perspective’ (Paper presented at 
Criminal Law Conference, Uluru, 31 August – 1 September 2012). 
13    R v Bugmy [2012] NSWCCA 223 [23]. 
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II Relevance of Indigenous Background in Sentencing  
Australian sentencing courts have accounted for the circumstances of 
disadvantaged Indigenous offenders to reflect their reduced culpability14 and the 
deleterious impact of prison on Indigenous people.15 These circumstances have 
mitigated Indigenous offenders’ sentences where they are deemed relevant to the 
offender or the offence. In sentencing legislation across Australia there is 
substantial scope for sentencing courts to exercise their discretion to consider 
factors relevant to the individual defendant.16 These factors, which may operate to 
mitigate or aggravate sentences, are considered in relation to normative sentencing 
principles stipulated in the legislation, including punishment, deterrence, 
rehabilitation of the offender, offender accountability, denunciation of the 
offender’s conduct, community protection, and recognition of the seriousness of 
the offence and harm to the victim.17 Sentencing statutes also particularise some of 
the matters that courts are to have regard to when passing a sentence, such as the 
maximum penalty for the offence, the nature of and harm caused by the offence, 
the identity and age of the victim, the offender’s criminal record, character, age, 
intellectual capacity, prospects of rehabilitation, and remorse.18 With few 
exceptions,19 Indigenous background is not specifically listed as a relevant factor. 
At common law, the notion of ‘individualised justice’ requires that all 
relevant factors are taken into account, including the defendant’s background, in 
sentencing.20 Accordingly, the judiciary exercises its discretion to account for all 
‘circumstances of the offence and the offender’.21 In the sole High Court of                                                         
14  See, eg, Fernando (1992) 76 A Crim R 58; R v Hickey (Unreported, NSW Court of Criminal 
Appeal, Finlay, Abadee and Simpson JJ, 27 September 1994); R v Stone (1995) 84 A Crim R 218. 
15  See, eg, Fernando (1992) 76 A Crim R 58; Police (SA) v Abdulla (1999) 74 SASR 337; R v Smith 
[2003] SASC 263. 
16  Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 16A(2); Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) s 21A(1); 
Sentencing Act 1995 (NT) ss 5(2)(s), 6, 6A; Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) s 9(2)(r); 
Criminal Law (Sentencing Act) 1988 (SA) s 10(1)(o); Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 5(2)(g). 
17  See Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 16A; Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) s 3A; 
Sentencing Act 1995 (NT) s 5(1); Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) s 9(1); Crimes 
(Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) s 7; Criminal Law (Sentencing Act) 1988 (SA) s 10; Sentencing Act 
1997 (Tas) s 3; Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 5(1); Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) s 6. 
18  Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 16A; Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) s 21A; Sentencing 
Act 1995 (NT) s 6A; Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) s 9(2); Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 
(ACT) s 33; Criminal Law (Sentencing Act) 1988 (SA) s 10; Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) s 9; 
Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) ss 7, 8. 
19  The ACT legislation provides that the court must consider whether the cultural background of the 
offender is relevant (Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) s 33(m)). Courts in Queensland, when 
sentencing an Indigenous person, must have regard to submissions made by a representative of the 
community justice group in the offender’s community, including ‘any cultural considerations’ 
(Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) s 9(2)(p)). In the Northern Territory, a sentencing court 
may receive information about an aspect of Indigenous customary law, or the views of members of 
an Indigenous community, but only where certain procedural requirements have been fulfilled 
(Sentencing Act 1995 (NT) s104A). However in the Northern Territory and Commonwealth 
jurisdictions, cultural practices and customary laws cannot be taken into account to mitigate or 
aggravate an offence (Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) ss 16A(2A), 16AA(1)). 
20  Wong v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 584, 611. 
21  R v Whyte (2002) 55 NSWLR 252, 276. 
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Australia judgment to address the significance of Indigenous issues in sentencing, 
Brennan J stated: 
The same sentencing principles are to be applied, of course, in every case, 
irrespective of the identity of a particular offender or his membership of an 
ethnic or other group. But in imposing sentences courts are bound to take into 
account, in accordance with those principles, all material facts including those 
facts which exist only by reason of the offender’s membership of an ethnic or 
other group. So much is essential to the even administration of criminal 
justice.22 
Discretion is applied on a case by case basis to determine whether 
Indigenous factors are relevant to reducing a sentence.23 An Indigenous offender 
has no special right to receive leniency by virtue of Indigenous status alone.24 
Sentencing courts rely on Indigenous factors only when the offender is a member 
of an Indigenous community and his/her offence or punishment reflects that 
membership.25 Therefore, it is necessary for sentencing submissions to point not 
only to the Indigenous background of the offender but how this has affected his/her 
life and contributed to offending. Mildren J of the Northern Territory Supreme 
Court stresses that the Court only considers Indigenous matters that are relevant to 
‘ordinary’ sentencing principles.26 He describes the Court’s reasoning and process 
in the following way: 
Customary law or cultural practices sometimes provide relevant background 
material of a secondary fact to prove a primary fact which has traditionally 
been regarded as a mitigatory fact. For example, in cases involving ‘pay-back’ 
[Indigenous law punishment], the relevant primary fact is that the accused has 
already been punished or in the future will be punished by others for his or her 
offence. The principle being invoked in such cases is that, to ignore this, it 
would expose the offender to an element of double punishment. In such cases 
the court applies exactly the same sentencing principles when sentencing an 
Aboriginal person as anyone else.27  
In this respect, the interpretation and application of Indigenous circumstances in 
sentencing operate within the common law’s general sentencing principles. The 
Indigenous offender’s disadvantaged background provides a relevant context for 
mitigating the offence, including reducing the offender’s moral culpability. It may 
also explain how principles of deterrence can be promoted through non-prison 
sentences. 
III The Fernando Principles 
The New South Wales Fernando28 principles set the tone for considerations when 
sentencing Indigenous offenders. In recognising the relevance of Indigenous                                                         
22  Neal v The Queen (1982) 149 CLR 305, 326 (‘Neal’). 
23  R v Woodley, Boonga & Charles (1994) 76 A Crim R 302. 
24  Neal (1982) 149 CLR 305, 326. 
25  Fernando (1992) 76 A Crim R 58, 63; R v Minor (1992) 105 FLR 180, 190. 
26  Dean Mildren, ‘Customary Law: Is It Relevant?’ (2008) 1(2) Northern Territory Law Journal 69, 75. 
27  Ibid 73–4. 
28  (1992) 76 A Crim R 58. 
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background, poverty and alcoholism to mitigation, the New South Wales Supreme 
Court in Fernando drew on a body of sentencing remarks across Australia.29 
Crystallising this case law, the Court enunciated the following oft-cited principles: 
1. Facts relevant to the offenders’ membership of a group should be 
accounted for, but ‘the same sentencing principles are to be applied in 
every case’. 
2. Aboriginality does not necessarily ‘mitigate punishment’ but may 
‘throw light on the particular offence and the circumstances of the 
offender’. 
3. Alcohol abuse and violence ‘go hand in hand within Aboriginal 
communities’, feeding into ‘grave social difficulties’ of unemployment, 
low education, stress, and so on. 
4. Mitigation should be provided where alcohol abuse reflects the 
offender’s ‘socio-economic circumstances and environment’. 
5. Courts should provide punishment to protect Indigenous victims and 
reflect the seriousness of ‘violence by drunken persons’, particularly 
domestic violence. 
6. A long prison term is particularly alienating and ‘unduly harsh’ for 
Indigenous people who come from a ‘deprived background’ or have 
‘little experience of European ways’. 
7. The relationship between violence and alcohol abuse in Indigenous 
communities requires ‘more subtle remedies’ than imprisonment. 
8. The public interest in ‘rehabilitation of the offender and the avoidance 
of recidivism on his part’ should be given full weight.30 
Also influencing the New South Wales Supreme Court in Fernando were 
the findings of the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody,31 which 
had just been handed down when the case was heard. The Royal Commission’s 
Final Report fuelled concerns about the over-imprisonment of Indigenous people 
and made a case for a distinct jurisprudence for sentencing Indigenous offenders, 
including that prison is a sanction of last resort. This report was referred to in                                                         
29  Ibid 62. The New South Wales Supreme Court referred to the following cases: the Queensland 
Court of Criminal Appeal case of R v Friday (1985) 14 A Crim R 471, 472, where it was held that 
the defendant was ‘a victim of the circumstances in which her life had placed her’; Yougie v The 
Queen (1987) 33 A Crim R 301, 304, where the same court held that ‘it would be wrong to fail to 
acknowledge the social difficulties faced by Aboriginals’ that have ‘placed heavy stresses on them 
leading to alcohol abuse and consequential violence’. The Western Australian Court of Criminal 
Appeal, in Rogers v The Queen (1989) 44 A Crim R 301, 305, which recognised the ‘notorious 
fact’ that the ‘use of alcohol by Aboriginal persons in relatively recent times has caused grave 
social problems, including problems of violence’, which should ‘provide circumstances of 
mitigation’, and the same court’s remarks in R v Juli (1990) 50 A Crim R 31, 36, which maintained 
that the ‘abuse of alcohol reflects the socio-economic circumstances and the environment in which 
[the Indigenous offender] has grown up and should be taken into account as a mitigating factor’. 
30  Fernando (1992) 76 A Crim R 58, 62–3. 
31  Commonwealth, Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody, National Report (1991). 
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Fernando32 as evidence of the unique conditions for Indigenous people in the 
criminal justice system, although the New South Wales Supreme Court did not 
aver its significance. 
While Wood J’s remarks in Fernando were not in themselves novel, they 
synthesised the Indigenous factors to be taken into account and formulated them 
within a paradigm that balanced competing sentencing considerations, such as the 
seriousness of the crime and the harm to the victim. Consequently, the eight 
Fernando principles for sentencing Indigenous offenders from disadvantaged 
communities have been influential across Australia.33 They are informed by the 
same judicial considerations that deem Indigenous laws, Indigenous punishment 
systems and political grievances relevant to mitigation.34 The facts of Fernando’s 
case were that Fernando stabbed his friend and onetime de facto partner, causing 
serious wounds to her neck and leg. Fernando’s background was marked by low 
levels of education and forcible removal from his family by the Welfare 
Department. He was sent to an isolated property and thereafter lived in Walgett, a 
racially divided community in north-western New South Wales where Indigenous 
people, including Fernando, were beleaguered with socio-economic hardship.35 He 
had a criminal history that was linked to his excessive alcohol consumption and 
had consumed large amounts of alcohol just before the stabbing.  
Wood J had to contend with the significance of the defendant’s Indigenous 
circumstances. Should his economic disadvantage and ensuing alcoholism mitigate 
the criminal sentence? Do these factors weigh particularly heavily on Indigenous 
offenders? What bearing would a lighter sentence have on social justice for 
Indigenous people? Is sentencing a means of compensation or restoration? The 
New South Wales Supreme Court’s answers to these questions set the context for 
the Fernando principles that have provided signposts for sentencing Indigenous 
offenders. These include mitigation to reflect the Indigenous offender’s lower 
moral culpability, an acknowledgment that imprisonment is particularly harsh on 
Indigenous offenders, and the need for non-custodial options to address the 
relationship between violence and alcohol abuse.  
IV Judicial Rationales for Reducing Indigenous Prison 
Sentences  
Following Fernando, the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal and appeal 
courts in other states adopted and expounded its principles and observations. In R v                                                         
32  (1992) 76 A Crim R 58, 62. 
33  Sheryn Omeri, ‘Considering Aboriginality’ (2006) 44(7) Law Society Journal 74, 76. 
34  See Neal (1982) 149 CLR 305; R v Benny Lee [1974] NTSC 221; R v Minor (1992) 105 FLR 180; 
R v Miyatatawuy (1996) 87 A Crim R 574; and more generally: Thalia Anthony, ‘Sentencing 
Indigenous Offenders’, Indigenous Justice Clearinghouse Brief 7 (2010); Thalia Anthony, 
Indigenous People, Crime and Punishment (Routledge, 2013). 
35  Cilka Zagar (ed), Growing up Walgett: Young Members of the Walgett Aboriginal Community 
Speak Out (Aboriginal Studies Press, 1990) xi; Kate Ross and John Taylor, ‘The Relative Social 
and Economic Status of Indigenous People in Bourke, Brewarrina and Walgett’ (Working Paper 
No. 8/2000, Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research, 2000) vii–viii. 
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Hickey,36 the Court referred to the ‘tragic truth’ of the ‘litany of disadvantage’ that 
frequently accompanies Indigeneity and should be taken into account in sentencing 
where relevant. In R v Stone,37 the Court allowed an appeal against the trial judge’s 
finding that the strength of the Fernando principles had been eroded because the 
defendant had committed similar serious offences in the past. It held that the 
significance of subjective factors pertaining to the Indigenous defendant should not 
be diminished by the objective aggravating circumstances such as the seriousness 
of the offence.38 In 1999, the South Australian Supreme Court held that the 
Fernando principles have broad application to Indigenous offending in remote and 
urban communities and cannot be offset by ‘tariff’ (minimum) sentences.39 Also 
commenting that the Fernando principles were ‘not restricted to traditional 
aboriginals’, the South Australian Court of Criminal Appeal found that heritage, 
rather than geography, contributes to the offender’s circumstances.40 
However, Indigenous specificity has not only been recognised in relation to 
the nature of the defendant’s disadvantaged Indigenous community and 
upbringing, but also in relation to Indigenous over-representation in the prison 
system. This affects the framing of the sentencing determination by shifting the 
focus from ‘the problem’ of the Indigenous community and circumstances, to ‘the 
problem’ of punishment and imprisonment for Indigenous people. It points the 
finger at the dominant institutions which create the patterns of subversion and 
symbolise ‘white on black’ violence.41 In addition to the New South Wales 
Supreme Court’s remarks in Fernando that referred to the ‘unduly harsh’ impact of 
prison for Indigenous people,42 the South Australian Supreme Court highlighted 
the ‘debilitating affect’ that imprisonment has on Indigenous people, and referred 
to the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention43 as endorsing penalties ‘other 
than confinement in prison’.44 In R v Smith45 the South Australian Court of 
Criminal Appeal noted that the ‘cultural milieu’ of the prison is foreign to remote 
and urban Indigenous offenders. These remarks signal the need for sentencing to 
be sensitive to issues of Indigeneity not only because of the disadvantaged 
background of the Indigenous defendant but also because of the potential for 
prison to have an acute adverse effect on the Indigenous defendant and his/her 
community. 
                                                        
36  (Unreported, NSW Court of Criminal Appeal, Finlay, Abadee and Simpson JJ, 27 September 1994) 4.  
37  (1995) 84 A Crim R 218. 
38  R v Stone (1995) 84 A Crim R 218, 224. 
39  Police (SA) v Abdulla (1999) 74 SASR 337, 343–4. 
40  R v Smith [2003] SASC 263 [60]–[61]. 
41  Harry Blagg, ‘Colonial Critique and Critical Criminology: Issues in Aboriginal Law and Aboriginal 
Violence’ in Thalia Anthony and Chris Cunneen (eds), The Critical Criminology Companion 
(Hawkins Press, 2008) 129, 139. 
42  Fernando (1992) 76 A Crim R 58, 62–3. 
43  Opened for signature 27 June 1989, ILO C169 (entered into force 5 September 1991). 
44  Police (SA) v Abdulla (1999) 74 SASR 337, 344. 
45  R v Smith [2003] SASC 263 [61]. 
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V The First Instance Decision and Appeal  
In May 2013, the High Court granted special leave to appeal the decision of the 
New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal in R v Bugmy.46 A central ground for 
the appeal was that the Court of Criminal Appeal erred in holding that the weight 
attributed to the Fernando principles lessen by virtue of the offender’s lengthy 
criminal history, the objective seriousness of his offences and the need for 
deterrence. In 2011, the defendant had pleaded guilty to two counts of assaulting a 
Corrective Services Officer contrary to the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 60A (1), 
which attracts a maximum penalty of five years’ imprisonment, and one count of 
causing grievous bodily harm with intent contrary to s 33(1)(b) which attracts up to 
25 years’ imprisonment. The latter offence involved a prison officer being struck in 
the eye with a pool table ball, resulting in the loss of sight in that eye and post-
traumatic stress.  
At the time of the offence, Bugmy, a 29-year-old Indigenous man from 
Wilcannia in north-western New South Wales, was on remand for assaulting 
police, resisting police, escaping from police custody, intimidating police and 
causing malicious damage by fire. His childhood involved exposure to violence 
and alcohol abuse, and he commenced using cannabis and alcohol at the age of 12. 
Bugmy was educated to Year 7, resulting in poor literacy and numeracy skills. He 
has a history of head injuries and suffered from auditory hallucinations and 
psychotic symptoms of a schizophrenic type. Since the age of 13 Bugmy has 
committed numerous offences of break, enter and steal, assault, resist police and 
damage to property, and has served long terms of imprisonment for these offences. 
He has never attended a detoxification or rehabilitation facility. Bugmy had asked 
for assistance with treatment of his alcohol abuse on numerous occasions but 
without success. He had negative attitudes towards authority figures, particularly 
the police, attitudes that were described by an expert witness as attributable to 
family ‘cultural issues’.47 Expert evidence adduced in court pointed to the need for 
Bugmy to undergo extended counselling for his drug and alcohol abuse problems 
and regular psychiatric review in view of his reported ‘voices’.48 These voices may 
point to an undiagnosed mental illness.  
In sentencing Bugmy, District Court Judge Lerve ordered, for all of the 
assault charges, imprisonment with a non-parole period of 4 years and 3 months. 
Pursuant to the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 21A, Lerve ADCJ took into account the 
aggravating factors that the victims were Correctional Services Officers, that a 
victim suffered significant psychological injury, that the defendant used the pool 
ball as a weapon, and the defendant’s criminal record. The judge also accepted, in 
mitigation, that the offence was unplanned and committed on the spur of the 
moment in a fit of anger, concluding that the offence was ‘slightly less serious than 
the mid-range of objective seriousness for offences of this kind’.49 In recognising 
the defendant’s disadvantaged background, the judge took into account the                                                         
46  [2012] NSWCCA 223. 
47  Ibid [23]. 
48  Ibid. 
49  Ibid [13], [30]. 
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Fernando principle that sentencing decisions should recognise the defendant’s 
social disadvantage that precedes the commission of a crime.50 He also accounted 
for Bugmy’s mental illness and the need for rehabilitation to address his alcohol 
and substance abuse. Bugmy’s sentence was moderated on account of ‘psycho-
social evidence’ as it limited the value of general deterrence in this case.51 The 
judge stressed that the defendant’s ‘very great need for intensive residential 
fulltime rehabilitation’ pointed to a lesser prison sentence despite his substantial 
criminal history.52 This operated ‘very much in favour of a finding of special 
circumstances’.53 
The Director of Public Prosecutions appealed against the District Court’s 
sentence on three grounds — that the sentencing judge failed to determine properly 
the objective seriousness of the offence (which would have taken into account the 
status of the victim as a correctional officer); placed too much weight on the 
defendant’s subjective circumstances to ameliorate the sentence, and that the total 
sentence imposed was manifestly inadequate. On the first two grounds alone, the 
New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal allowed the appeal and increased the 
sentence for the grievous bodily harm offence to a five-year non-parole period. The 
Court did not consider the issue of whether the original sentence was manifestly 
inadequate. 
The Court of Appeal’s judgment, delivered by Hoeben JA, found that the 
objective seriousness of the offence, including the category of the victim, were 
important matters of aggravation and required that the sentence incorporate a 
message of personal and general deterrence.54 The Court was of the view that the 
sentencing judge did not deliver this message adequately.55 In relation to the 
weight of the subjective factors impermissibly ameliorating the sentence, the Court 
accepted Crown submissions that Lerve ADCJ failed to account for the defendant’s 
lack of contrition and remorse and gave insufficient weight to the defendant’s 
criminal record.56 The Court also held that the sentencing judge erred by taking 
into account the defendant’s mental illness to reduce the weight to be given to 
general deterrence.57 Finally, the Court held that the Indigenous background and 
difficult circumstances Bugmy faced as a young person, such as the exposure to 
alcohol abuse, were not significant given the defendant’s offending history.58 The 
Court followed its own decision in R v Newman,59 discussed below, where it held 
that ‘it is not every case of deprivation and disadvantage suffered by an offender of 
aboriginal race or ancestry that calls for the special approach adopted in 
Fernando’.60 This was applied in Bugmy’s case because of his early and ongoing 
contact with the criminal justice system that required a message of specific                                                         
50  Ibid [26]–[27]. 
51  Ibid [27]. 
52  Ibid. 
53  Ibid. 
54  Ibid [35]–[38]. 
55  Ibid [38]. 
56  Ibid [40]–[42]. 
57  Ibid [45]. 
58  Ibid [49]–[50]. 
59  (2004) 145 A Crim R 361, 376. 
60  R v Bugmy [2012] NSWCCA 223 [49]. 
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(personal) and general deterrence.61 The Court concluded that ‘with the passage of 
time, the extent to which social deprivation in a person’s youth and background 
can be taken into account, must diminish’.62  
Notwithstanding its recognition that Indigenous background can be taken 
into account, the Court set up an inverse correlation between the significance of 
Indigenous background and the significance of the offender’s criminal history.63 
Thus in Bugmy’s case, the extent to which this matter could be taken into account 
was limited.64 The Court upheld that the primary objective of sentencing for 
criminal offences is community protection from crimes through personal and 
general deterrence.65 It ruled that the consideration of the Fernando principles in 
reducing the weight to be given to general deterrence should only be modest.66 
Based on Bugmy’s criminal history, the objective seriousness of the offence and 
the need for deterrence, the Court increased his sentence. 
During the application for special leave to the High Court, Bugmy’s counsel 
submitted that the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal’s privileging of the 
seriousness of the offence to minimise the relevance of the social deprivation in the 
offender’s youth and Indigenous background was erroneous in principle. This error 
was compounded by comments that a defendant’s substantial offending history 
diminished the significance of Indigenous factors — a finding that could not be 
supported in law.67 Bugmy’s counsel stated that these grounds of appeal are ‘a 
matter of significant and indeed profound importance for the administration of 
criminal justice and for the sentencing, in particular, of indigenous offenders not 
only in New South Wales but nationally’.68 Other grounds of appeal include the 
relevance of mental impairment to reducing the effect of general deterrence and the 
failure of the Court of Appeal to consider the matter of the manifest inadequacy 
and whether its residual discretion should have been exercised to dismiss the 
Crown’s appeal. The High Court’s granting of leave in Bugmy’s case has opened a 
window for it to reflect on the role of sentencing Indigenous offenders in a society 
with an ever-expanding Indigenous prison population.  
VI Revisions of Fernando in the Past Decade: the Rise of 
Seriousness and Deterrence 
The emphasis on the seriousness of the offence of the New South Wales Court of 
Criminal Appeal in R v Bugmy is not new. Over the past decade the Court, in 
hearing appeals on the sentences for Indigenous offenders, has increasingly placed 
value on the seriousness of the offence and deterrence above the culpability of the 
offender and the need for more subtle remedies than imprisonment.69 This trend is                                                         
61  Ibid [38]. 
62  Ibid [50]. 
63  Ibid. 
64  Ibid. 
65  Ibid. 
66  Ibid [52]. 
67  Transcript of Proceedings, Bugmy v The Queen [2013] HCATrans 111 (10 May 2013). 
68  Ibid. 
69  See R v Newman (2004) 145 A Crim R 361; R v Ceissman (2001) 119 A Crim R 535 (‘Ceissman’). 
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also present in other Australian jurisdictions.70 This is despite the fact that the 
definition of offence seriousness is not clearly stated in principle or legislation.71 In 
Neal,72 Brennan J of the High Court held that moral culpability and the emotional 
disposition of the offender can be relevant to determining the seriousness of the 
offence or ‘gravity’ of the conduct.73 Nonetheless, courts often equate seriousness 
exclusively with the harm to the victim, who is regarded as an ‘authentic 
expression’ of harm.74 They refer to the concept as ‘objective seriousness’ to imply 
a rational calculation of the scale of harm.75 Reference to the victim can invoke a 
punitive response without recourse to mitigating circumstances, including the 
moral culpability of the offender. In Bugmy’s case, the Court of Criminal Appeal 
regarded the harm to the victim, an on-duty corrections officer, as an aggravating 
factor that overshadowed Bugmy’s special circumstances.  
Since the late 1990s there has been an increasing tendency for courts to 
confine the significance of Indigenous background on the basis of the primacy of 
the objective seriousness of the offence and the need for deterrence and community 
protection. Higher courts have also been inclined to disregard the defendant’s 
Indigenous background where the defendant has come from an urban, as opposed 
to remote, Indigenous community. Ceissman76 was one of the first New South 
Wales Court of Criminal Appeal cases that downplayed the significance of 
Indigenous circumstances because the offender resided in an urban environment 
and was ‘part-aboriginal’. Ceissman, who was convicted of trafficking cocaine, 
‘grew up in extreme poverty’, received little education, had parents who were drug 
addicts with criminal histories, witnessed serious physical violence between them, 
and was orphaned when he was 11 years old.77 His circumstances did not enliven 
the Fernando principles because Ceissman was not ‘from a remote community for 
whom imprisonment would be unduly harsh’.78 The Court in Ceissman privileged 
the guideline sentence that is predicated on the seriousness of the crime of drug 
importation over subjective Indigenous considerations.79 
Following Ceissman,  in R v Morgan,80 the New South Wales Court of 
Criminal Appeal applied its reasoning to an offender who committed robbery, 
break and enter and assault. The defendant was brought up in a town in central                                                         
70  See Wurramara (1999) 105 A Crim R 512 (NT); The State of Western Australia v Munda [2012] 
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Punishments: a reply to Julia Davis’ in Cyrus Tata and Neil Hutton (eds) Sentencing and Society: 
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Victoria and had an ‘intimidating, violent and alcohol dependent’ father. The 
offender was found by the Court not to be ‘particularly disadvantaged’, despite 
having to flee his home regularly to avoid his abusive father and spending ‘a good 
part of his early life in boys’ homes or correctional centres’.81 Because the 
‘offences were not alcohol-related and the appellant did not come from a remote 
community, nor was he unfamiliar with the justice system’, the Fernando 
principles were not applied.82 This is despite the fact that the defendant lived near 
Shepparton — a town 200 kilometres out of Melbourne. The Court held that the 
defendant’s Indigenous background, as far as they related to the Fernando 
principles, ‘added little to the … sentencing exercise beyond those matters which 
would otherwise have been taken into account, for any offender’.83 Rather, the 
Court attributed significant weight to the serious nature of the offending. 
This narrow conception of the Fernando principles came to bear on the 
Court of Criminal Appeal’s sentencing remarks in R v Newman, R v Simpson.84 
The Court distinguished the Indigenous defendants, who were from Griffith in 
central New South Wales, from defendants in ‘a remote community’, who would 
be more likely to enliven the Fernando principles.85 One defendant, Newman, was 
forcibly removed from his family at a young age to an isolated mission property. 
He had an early introduction to alcohol in communities where drinking was ‘not 
only the norm but positively encouraged by peer group pressure’, and his criminal 
record was ‘exclusively, if not entirely’ alcohol related.86 The Court questioned 
whether Aboriginality was an issue at all, observing that the offenders’ 
‘lamentable’ background of disadvantage and alcohol and drug abuse ‘is not in any 
way unique nor is it restricted to any particular community group’.87 It regarded 
alcohol and drug abuse as arising from a common type of ‘deprivation or abuse 
early in life’ that does not give rise to special consideration, ‘notwithstanding [the 
offender’s] Aboriginality’.88 The seriousness of the offence — aggravated entering 
dwelling with intent to commit a serious offence — also made it legitimate to ‘give 
little weight to the applicant’s subjective circumstances’.89  
The privileging of the seriousness of the offence above considerations of 
Indigenous background has also been evident in remarks by the Northern Territory 
and Western Australian Courts of Criminal Appeal since the late 1990s — each 
confining the relevance of the Fernando principles. In the Northern Territory, the 
Indigenous background of the offender has not come under scrutiny, but there has 
been a strong emphasis on the sentencing principles of deterrence and the 
seriousness of the offence, as well as upholding the wider community’s interest in                                                         
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lengthy imprisonment. In the seminal Northern Territory Court of Criminal Appeal 
decision of R v Wurramarra,90 the Court stressed the seriousness of the offence 
above all other sentencing considerations. The Court noted that the ‘dysfunctional’ 
status of the defendant’s community on Groote Eylandt, with its prevalence of 
alcohol abuse and violence, was ‘by no means’ justification for ‘a lower 
sentence’.91 In fact, it was taken to signal the need for a strong deterrence message, 
notwithstanding the Court’s recognition that imprisonment has limited impact on 
the ‘dysfunction or deprivation’ that lie at the root of violence.92 According to the 
former Principal Solicitor of the North Australian Aboriginal Justice Agency, Glen 
Dooley, Wurramarra has contributed to the rapid increase — a doubling between 
1999 and 2009 — in the Northern Territory’s prison population.93 In Bryce 
Jabaltjari Spencer v The Queen, the Court of Criminal Appeal stated that 
Wurramarra displaced the Fernando principles and therefore the defendant’s 
membership of a ‘deprived or dysfunctional’ community ‘does not mean that lower 
sentences should prevail’ where there is a serious offence.94 The Court has also 
stated that due to the seriousness of the crime, ‘the interests of the wider 
community demand the prisoner be punished by the loss of his liberty’.95 In other 
cases the Court has applied a common law ‘standard sentencing’ approach for 
serious offenders, based on a scale of seriousness and notwithstanding their 
Indigenous background and its effect on moral culpability.96 
In the recent decision of Western Australia v Munda,97 the Western 
Australian Court of Criminal Appeal upheld the relevance of the Fernando 
principles but stated that Indigeneity was to be afforded little weight because of the 
seriousness of the offence involving drunken violence as well as the need for 
personal and general deterrence. The sentencing remarks in Munda, like other 
recent applications of the Fernando principles, reveal a judicial retreat from 
considering the relevance of Indigenous background and the grave impact that 
imprisonment has on Indigenous people. These revisions of Fernando have raised 
concerns that substantive equality and individualised justice are being undermined. 
These concerns have come from legal commentators98 and the Aboriginal legal 
service that brought the appeal in Bugmy v The Queen. 
When assessments of seriousness are based exclusively on harm, issues of 
culpability are neglected along with the fact that ‘strong social disadvantages may 
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be at the root of much offending’.99 According to Hudson, it also reduces the crime 
to its actus reus by removing the mental element.100 This justifies terms of 
imprisonment without consideration of the broader circumstances of the offending. 
Equally, notions of deterrence assume that ‘more prison equals less crime’, and 
neglect factors impinging on the defendant’s choice, or the choices of others in the 
general population when committing crimes.101 These notions underestimate the 
significance of factors which include in Bugmy’s case a background of 
disadvantage, alcohol and substance abuse and mental impairment, as well as tense 
relations with law enforcement authorities. The current application of ‘deterrence’ 
in sentencing also overestimates the role of imprisonment in reducing crime, and in 
doing so overlooks other strategies that may be more effective in crime prevention. 
With respect to Bugmy, evidence adduced in the District Court suggested that his 
offending may have been better addressed through non-penal institutions rather 
than imprisonment — evidence that was diminished on appeal due to a narrow 
understanding of offence seriousness, community protection and deterrence.102 
VII Towards an Understanding of Community Protection 
Outside of the Prison 
As stated, the Fernando principles were formulated by the New South Wales 
Supreme Court after the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody 
handed down its seminal national report detailing the vast over-representation of 
Indigenous Australians in custody. According to the 2013 National Deaths in 
Custody Program Monitoring Report, in the 20 years since the Royal Commission, 
the number of Indigenous prisoners has almost doubled.103 Indigenous Australians 
account for 26 per cent of the prison population and have been described as the 
most punished population in the world.104 This indicates that longer prison 
sentences for Indigenous offenders are not having the requisite effect of deterrence 
and community protection. Abstract models of behaviour that assume autonomy 
and individual choice have sacrificed serious consideration of moral culpability 
and community circumstances while not delivering safer communities.  
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Increasing Indigenous imprisonment necessitates that the High Court 
consider whether the seriousness of the offence should overshadow mitigating 
circumstances relating to the offender’s background. Indeed, if courts are to hand 
down sentences that will restore and rehabilitate Indigenous offenders, greater 
emphasis needs to be placed on exploring community circumstances and how the 
offender may be better reintegrated and Indigenous communities strengthened. 
Bugmy is an example of an offender who was calling on the system to provide 
rehabilitation services, but only found institutional sanctuary in the prison. By 
failing to give substantial weight to Indigenous circumstances, the courts will 
continue to fall back on an imprisonment response when deterrence and 
community protection could be better served through non-custodial sentencing 
options and more appropriate community-based remedial services. 
